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ABSTRACT. This paper reviews the key weaknesses in the banking system related
to the 2007 global financial crisis and finds supervisory oversight and accountability underrepresented or missing in recommended solutions although they are a
critical contributor to the problem. The paper purports: (1) focusing on the fundamental factors that attribute to the vulnerability of the banking system is a key
component of a model for the mitigation of a financial crisis and; (2) the factors are
interrelated; therefore, the model should be holistic. The analysis results in an
integrative blueprint and includes a simple case study application. The findings of
the application support the concept of “regulatory capture”, since regulators could
and should have been able to identify problem institutions before the crisis and yet
did not intervene. The application also showed how government bailout, as a strategy, could be successful in restoring a failing institution. The missing link in being
able to mitigate a crisis is having effective oversight. Fortunately, the environment
is more conducive for such reform, in the wake of crises.
JEL Codes: G01, G28
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1. Introduction
A review of the literature on factors that led to the 2007 Global Financial
Crisis (2008 in the USA) reveals that those factors were known to academics
and regulators, have existed for some time, and continue to exist despite
regulatory efforts to the contrary (Lal, 2010; Poole, 2010a; Poole, 2010b;
Scott 2010; Leondis, 2010; Ennis and Keister, 2010). Broadly, the types of
crises have been classified as either (1) a micro crisis caused by poor bank11

ing practices, or (2) a macro crisis caused by sources external to the banking system (Klomp 2010). However, identifying the type of crisis seems to
be the easy part, the more difficult challenge, going forward, is to correctly
answer the question: What regulation is required to prevent either type of
crisis from reoccurring?
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision created by the central bank
governors of the Group of Ten nations, other regulatory bodies, academics,
and practitioners, are all fervently attempting to answer that question. Henry
Kauffman, a renowned economist, and others, believe there are no quick
fixes. However, he has identified, fragmentation of accountability, conflict
of interest in supervision, and outsourcing of due diligence, as key missing
elements in current discussions. These elements relate to ethical failures in
the regulation and supervision of the banking system and not so much in the
failure of institutions to meet regulatory requirements (Murphy, 2010: Kane,
2009; Singer, 2009; Sanjeev, 2007; McCormick, 2011, Haan and Osterloo,
2006).
This paper attempts to build a blueprint for the mitigation of future
financial crises, by first identifying the key fundamental weaknesses in the
banking system to include inadequate accountability and supervisory oversight as well as operating and systematic risks. Systematic risk is the risk
that losses are not confined to a single institution, but can be transmitted or
is capable of being transmitted to the financial system as a whole. This is
significant because the effects of the failure of the banking system on the
structure of markets are unpredictable and potentially catastrophic globally.
The next section, which develops the blueprint, first analyzes the veracity of
current recommended solutions, and then builds the recommended process
by addressing and incorporating each weakness. The goal there is to identify
a method to mitigate future crises using an inclusive, holistic approach. The
next section provides a simple case study application of the blueprint, which
proved quite instructive in confirming the validity of the process but also
identifies a remaining concern. The final section contains the conclusions
and thoughts for future research.
2. Key Weaknesses in the Banking System
The accountability and supervision variable is underrepresented in the literature with the current primary focus being on banking regulation related
to managing operating and systematic risks. Upon reviewing the literature,
and including both aspects of the need for regulatory reform, the fundamental weaknesses in the banking system can be classified into five broad
categories: (1) suboptimal risk-taking incentives; (2) pro-cyclicality; (3) inter12

connectedness; (4) unmanaged systematic risk; and (5) inadequate accountability and supervisory oversight.
2.1 Suboptimal Risk-taking Incentives
Barrow and Horvitz (1993) describe how government plays a key role in
the exacerbation of moral hazard problems within the banking system by:
• providing deposit insurance;
• acting as lender of last resort;
• bailing out institutions considered “too big to fail”; and
• failing to act upon known problems (forbearance) or by failing to observe/
monitor adverse behavior
Moral hazard occurs when there is an absence of accountability for risky or
incompetent behavior. Boyd (1999) argues that universal banking, where
banks are permitted to make equity investments, extends the distortion of
incentives caused by the moral hazards of agency theory to other sectors of
the economy, and significantly amplifies the problem.
Current evidence of how the problem persists is explored by Ratnovski
(2010) whose analysis finds that banks make suboptimal liquidity choices
due to distortions created by government bailouts that are unavoidable in a
systemic crisis. Another example, of the problem which still currently exists,
is seen in Nier and Bauman (2006) who show how the lack of market discipline created by government intervention (or forbearance), results in excessive risk taking, and potential conflict of interest between the bank and
its depositors, and subsequently resulting in the government providing deposit
insurance and or bailouts.
2.2 Pro-cyclicality
Berger and Udel (2004) in assessing the pro-cyclicality of bank lending
behavior found that lending often increases significantly during business
cycle expansions, and then falls considerably during subsequent downturns,
sometimes dramatically enough to be labeled a “credit crunch.” These changes
in lending are generally more than proportional to the changes in economic
activity, suggesting that they are changes in bank loan supply that tend to
accentuate the business cycle. They also found that banks may take significantly more risks during the expansion, but these risks are revealed only
later because it takes time for loan performance problems to appear. They
buttressed their arguments further by quoting Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan as saying, “the worst loans are made at the top of the business
cycle”, May 10, 2001. Chang and Chang’s (2013) research confirmed that
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CEO’s do indeed push for higher profits and of course higher bonuses
during periods of growth and prosperity as expected relative to the moral
hazards of agency theory. Allen and Saunders (2004) further find that the
literature relating to pro-cyclical tendencies of banking shows how banking
capital requirements along with monetary policy actually result in the amplification of exogenous shocks.
2.3 Interconnectedness
Mistrulli (2011) shows that, although interbank markets allow banks to
cope with specific liquidity shocks, at the same time, they may represent a
channel for contagion as a bank default may spread to other banks through
interbank linkages. Interconnectedness exacerbates systematic risk whereby
the failure of one significant institution, can cause or contribute to the failure
of other significant institutions; and the possibility that one exogenous shock
may cause or contribute to the failure of multiple significant financial institutions (Scott, 2010). Further, in evaluating global interconnectedness,
Devereux and Sutherland (2011) found that while global financial integration
in both bond and equity markets improved welfare, it generates high positive
co-movement across countries, which magnifies the crisis.
2.4 Unmanaged Systematic Risk
Financial institutions play an integral role in the functioning of the economy,
and are expected to be given proactive priority. However, historically, bank
regulations tend to be passed in response to various crises rather than to
prevent them from occurring (Barth et al. 2010; Holowecky et al. 2010).
Despite the tremendous advances in financial risk measurement, experts
and analysts alike, failed to predict the recent global financial crisis (Poole,
2010b).
A more concerning issue may not be the systems’ inability to predict a
financial crisis but its inability to prevent a financial crisis, even if it is
predicted. Kane (2009) has outline a scenario whereby, in trying to meet
regulatory capital requirements, institutions turn to private sources of capital,
he calls shadow entities. These large investors can trigger a silent run and
completely undermine the stability of a financial institution. These events
fall under the radar of investors leaving regulators with little option but to
bailout the affected institution(s) if deemed too big to fail. Unfortunately,
as Ennis and Keister (2010) conclude, financial crises have a self-fulfilling
component since banks’ operating structure makes them susceptible to runs,
and are therefore innately fragile.
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2.5 Inadequate Accountability and Supervisory Oversight
Kane (2009) attributes the 2007 global crisis to the breakdown in incentives
of regulators, supervisors, managers and investors to perform adequate due
diligence over security investments. He also identifies, as a culprit, incentive
conflicts that undermine the effectiveness of government supervision. In his
view, undeterred, institutions would engineer assets, liabilities and hedging
instruments, and ruthlessly exploit weaknesses in various jurisdictions. In
short, the 2007 global crisis was a product of regulatory environment induced
innovation that pushed business into unregulated areas. Regulators also,
incorrectly outsourced the task of risk-assessment to credit agencies that
did not have the appropriate incentives.
Raffer, from as early as 2004, found that the success of market economies is based on linking decisions to risks. Additionally, Kane (2009)
shows that not only does the current financial system have defective monitoring, it also fails to make anyone directly accountable for reporting or
controlling in a conscientious and timely manner. Even the accounting
system does not report the value of the regulatory benefits, a key factor in
being able to hold regulators accountable. Both the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) and the International Accounting Standards Board
(IASB) have since added issues related to the crisis to their agendas (FASB
and IFRS, 2013)
Dickson (2010) claims that Canada’s financial system held up well during
the economic crisis and attributes that to the fact that day-to-day oversight
is given equal significance to regulatory rules. Dickson further states that
the financial sector, with strong regulatory rules and sound risk management practices but with weak supervisory oversight, is not safe. The Basel
Committee has issued three white papers addressing various strategic factors.
Their focus has been more on rules than on approaches to supervision. In
fact, the Basel Core Principles for Effective Supervision simply states “The
Core Principles are neutral with regards to different approaches to supervision, so long as the overriding goals are achieved.”
2.6 Weakness Implications
When taken together, the five weaknesses identified resulted in losses that
caused key financial institutions to fail, which spread to other interdependent
institutions, not just locally but nationally and internationally. The interrelationship between the factors is shown in Figure 1 and summarized in
Table 1. As depicted in the figure, it is the failure of supervisory oversight
that allowed the other weaknesses to successfully undermine the financial
system.
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Teply (2010) noticed that Basel II addressed only credit, market and
operational risks. Missing in coverage were risks such as market, off-balance
sheet, systematic, contagion and unknown events. One lesson learned is that
each of those risks supports the need for better oversight and accountability
by regulators, risk managers, management, investors and the government.
Table 1 summarizes the weaknesses and the causes. All the factors can be
related to inadequate supervisory oversight and accountability.
Fig. 1 Fundamental weaknesses in the banking system

This Figure 1 demonstrates that breaches in supervisory oversight
and accountability leave the financial system vulnerable
Table 1 Summary of the fundamental weaknesses
in the banking system and the causes
Weakness
Suboptimal risk taking incentives

Pro-cyclicality
Interconnectedness

Causes
Moral
hazard
Deposit
Insurance
Forbearance
Faulty
monitoring
Lack of market
discipline
Conflict of
interest
Universal
Banking
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Un-managed systematic risk

Inadequate Accountability and
Supervisory oversight

Counter-cyclical business operations
Interbank markets
Vulnerability to liquidity shocks
Contagion across linked institutions
Inability to predict and prevent a crisis
Use of large/significant shadow entities

Breakdown in incentives of
regulators Exploitation of
weaknesses in jurisdiction Lack
of day-to-day oversight

This Table 1 identifies the summarizes the causes of
the fundamental weakness to the banking

Prospective oversight ethics dictate that oversight institutions should be designed to, effectively, prevent wrongs. Unfortunately, overseers face a significant moral hazard problem to not engage in vigilant oversight. This
problem is further exacerbated by the possibility of “regulation capture”
which states that regulatory vigilance decreases in the absence of a crisis.
Inspectors become too close to the inspected and the capacity for independent
judgment is undermined or lost. (Swartz, 2008)
3. A Blueprint for the Mitigation of a Financial Crisis
This paper purports that: (1) focusing on the five fundamental factors that
attribute to the vulnerability of the banking system is a key component of a
model for the mitigation of a financial crisis and; (2) the factors are interrelated; therefore, the model should be holistic and inclusive of supervisory
oversight and accountability. We begin by looking at the veracity of the
solutions already proposed. We will then provide a process to prevent or
mitigate future financial crises by focusing on the fundamental weaknesses
presented in the previous section. This involves managing systematic risk;
identifying factors that can signal trouble and trigger intervention; and
providing for regulatory accountability and oversight.
3.1 The Veracity of Proposed Solutions
Scott (2010) summarizes solutions provided by academics and regulators
include recommendations to:
• alter capital requirements;
• change clearing houses usage requirements;
17

• alter the way insolvent institutions are resolved;
• continue emergency lending by the Fed, and
• restructure the regulatory system.
All such solutions have been argued to be burdensome and ineffective to
prevent a systematic risk based crisis. Evidence of the ineffectiveness of
these proposed solutions is seen in the failure of Basel II, passed in 2004,
which did not prevent the crisis. The Basel III documents, submitted in
2009, attempted to improve the regulation of the financial system but still
leaves significant systematic risk exposure which is one of the main factors
that helped cause the crisis in the first place (Boerner, 2010; Holbrook,
2010; Weber, 2010; Triana, 2010).
For example, Berger et al. (2008) show that Bank Holding Companies
(BHC) had been actively managing their capital ratios, had set targets substantially above regulatory minima and made rapid adjustments towards
those targets. Even the new regulatory requirements under Basel III would
not have been adequate to prevent the crisis. Triana (2010) further shows that
Basel III: permits higher leverage (higher risk); has flawed risk measures;
and restricts opportunities for higher potential returns – increases risks and
lowers returns. Elimination of bailing-out failing banks is also not at option
because as Ennis and Keister (2010) conclude, financial crises have a selffulfilling component and that the banks’ operating structure makes them
susceptibility to runs and so they are innately fragile. Additionally, Mistrulli
(2011) found, after doing simulations, that by allowing conglomerates to
recapitalize their affiliates which otherwise would fail, the resilience to
financial contagion of the banking system tends to improve.
Prospective oversight ethics dictate that overseers prevent wrongs and
retrospective oversight ethics entails the conduct of investigations into the
failure of existing institutions in preventing wrong with an aim to improvement. Both processes failed. Unfortunately, policy makers are susceptible to
economic, political, cultural and bureaucratic pressures, and although recommendations for an international oversight body has merit, its application
would face, possibly insurmountable, blockades.
3.2. An Integrative Blueprint for Crisis Mitigation
Given that the banking system is fundamentally frail (Ennis and Keister,
2010) and that recapitalization, such as bailouts, improve the resilience to
financial contagion (Mistrulli, 2011), it is, therefore, recommended that
these agency theory issues not be addressed by removing the governmental
safeguards that contribute to the agency problem. Additionally, according
to Allen and Saunders (2004) U.S. banking regulators have contended that
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15–20 major banks and 5–10 major securities firms dominate critical financial markets, therefore as global financial markets consolidate and harmonize
the possibility of contagion risk increases. However, this smaller list of key
players could provide a more narrowly focused intervention/mitigation strategy.
In terms of pro-cyclicality, Franz (2010) has shown that the stock market
has been highly consistent in predicting economic expansions and contractions. Allen and Saunders (2004) found that, whereas a fundamentally
strong institution can often recover from market and credit risk, it might be
impossible for it to recover from certain operational risk events. Therefore,
the main concerns are the low frequency/high severity risk events, which
occur quite infrequently, consistent with the conditions precedent. These
factors as well as the regulators’ inability to monitor all financial institutions,
reinforces the recommendation to focus on the smaller list of key players.
Measures of interconnectivity relate to size and so, once again, identification of those major banks and securities firms, that dominate the market,
is critical. Also related to size and interconnectedness is measured by the
composition of the banks’ asset portfolio (Drumond, 2009).
All the factors are inter-related and therefore attribute to the systematic
risk problem. Since macroeconomic factors are affected by government actions, macroeconomic and firm specific factors must be dealt with separately
(Tsai and Chang, 2010). Their model establishes financial factors, market
variables and macroeconomic variables to successfully predict financial
distress. Therefore, it is recommended that the holistic interception model
incorporates a financial distress prediction model, to identify firm specific
risks such a discrete-time hazard model like the multi-period logit model,
which has been used successfully to estimate the significant parameters in
predicting financial distress (Tsai and Chang, 2010, Shunway 2001; Barrow,
1993). In its application, it is assumed that there is some linear combination
of the independent variables that is positively related to financial distress. The
parameters in the logit model can then be used to identify problem financial
institutions in conjunction with a predetermined distress cut-off point.
Given that, regulators and academics have known of the weaknesses and
challenges for some time, key missing elements are supervisory oversight
and accountability. According to Schwartz (2008) there are three critical
elements to oversight duties. They are (1) set standards, (2) provide resources
that enable overseers to gather information about the extent to which standards are being met, and (3) the provide tools for modifying the behavior of
non-compliance. This third element is where accountability becomes even
more important.
Research shows that most crises were caused by failures in supervisory
oversight and accountability. Coffee (2011) finds that regulatory supervision
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is likely to follow a “sine curve” which means that there is usually stricter
regulation after a crash followed by gradual relaxation. However, research
also found that crises that had more long-term and widespread significance
were more likely to have more sustainable regulatory changes. (Schwartz,
2008). Given the large scale and scope of the recent global financial crisis,
and the greater visibility, there is also a greater chance for more sustainable
changes in regulatory processes, supervisory oversight and accountability.
Summarized the blueprint recommends using a holistic approach. Specifically:
1. Maintain the governmental safeguards despite the related moral hazard
problems, given the fragility of the banking system.
2. Identify a small list of key players to provide a more narrowly-focused
intervention/mitigation strategy.
3. Utilize a financial distress prediction model, such a discrete-time hazard
model like the multi-period logit model, to identify firm specific risks and
systematic risks.
4. Maintain strong regulatory rules that provide for oversight and accountability with cause-effect related enforced consequences.
4. A Simple Application of the Process
A simple analysis was done to illustrate the importance of closely monitoring those flagged for intervention and using the stock market as a proxy for
economic activity. The stock market was chosen since it has been shown
that the S&P 500 is highly consistent in anticipating contractions and expansions in economic activity, and it is assumed that the stock market is
consistent in anticipating economic cycles (Franz, 2010). Fundamental company data was provided by Capital IQ, a business owned by the Standard
and Poor’s Company and accessible from Wharton Research Data Services
(WRDS). Capital IQ provides market data across all major quoted markets
including: equity, mutual funds, fixed income, indices, commodities, currencies, and rates. Equity pricing data includes close, open, bid, ask, mid,
low, best, high price values along with volume, splits, dividends, ticker,
exchange information, short interest data, and VWAP for select markets.
There were two key sources of banking data used to identify banks “too
big to fail” and those that would have the most significant impact related
to pro-cyclicality and interconnectedness. The first is from WRDS, a webbased business data research service from The Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. Their Bank Regulatory Database contains five databases for regulated depository financial institutions. These databases provide
accounting data for bank holding companies, commercial banks, savings
banks, and savings and loans institutions. Their data comes from the required
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regulatory forms filed for supervising purposes. The second source of data
is from the National Information Center (NIC), a central repository of data
about banks and other institutions for which the Federal Reserve has a
supervisory, regulatory and/or research interest, including both domestic and
foreign banking organizations operating in the United States. Their web
site provides access to NIC data, allowing the public to search for detailed
information about banking organizations.
The NIC has a Bank Holding Company Peer Groups report that contains
a summary of peer group financial data and a listing of Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) in each Peer Group. BHCs with assets over $500 million are
classified into one of nine tiers. Tier 1 consists of BHCs with consolidated
assets of $10 Billion and over. Given that only the top 20 or so financial
institutions dominate the financial markets, the top tier 1 banks with consolidated assets of $100 billion were selected for review. There were 22
institutions that met the criteria. These are the main institutions to monitor
in addressing the interconnectedness and pro-cyclicality systematic risks
considerations and therefore, the key financial institutions that should play
a major role in the financial crisis intervention or mitigation process. Note,
however, that the number is not static. Upon retrieving the data it was discovered that due to various reasons, such as reorganizations (TD Bank Holding Company, U.S. Bankcorp, Ally Financial Inc. and Citizens Financial
Group) or being privately held (Taunu Corporations), there were only 17
BHCs with complete market price data for analysis.
Figure 2 shows the correlation between the 17 remaining top BHCs and
the S&P 500, A clear outlier was institution number 11, Capital One Financial Corporation (COF). This would form a basis for further investigation.
Figure 3 show COF’s correlation trend for the 10 year period which includes
fives before the signal and the four years since, including the crises period.
This confirms that, indeed, 2006 was a significant year for COF when
compared to other BHCs, but it was also significant for COF over that the
ten-year period of 2001–2010. Capital One Financial was the recipient of
$3.56 billion of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act Federal bailout
in the form of a preferred stock purchase. (WRDS, 2010). However, according to ProPublica (retrieved 7/21/2011) COF returned its bailout funds on
June 9, 2009 with an additional $253 million dollars profit to the government.
4.1. Application of Findings
This case study application is quite instructive. It showed that early identification of the COF’s financial problems, as early as 2006, prior to the crisis,
was possible and, indeed, probable. It also showed that government bailout
as a strategy can be successful in preventing bankruptcy, and that it does not
21

have to be at a net loss to taxpayers. However, the possibility that regulators/
supervisors knew of the problem prior to 2008 yet did nothing, is real and
of concern. This supports Coffee (2010) in his claim that even if a failure is
predicted there will be intense and well financed push back from the institution and behaviors consistent with “regulatory capture.” Regulatory
capture occurs when bureaucrats, regulators, and politicians cease to serve
the collective public interest and begin to systematically favor specific vested
interests, usually the very interests they were supposed to regulate and restrain (Baker, 2010).
Coffee’s (2011) ‘sine curve” theory shows that there is a higher probability for stricter regulatory supervision following a crisis but it is followed
by a gradual relaxation. Baker (2010) further shows that regulatory capture
has evolved over 20 years. Regulatory easing has facilitated innovation,
incompletely regulated “shadow banking sector”, and with a boom, created
serious disincentives for politicians to take corrective actions. When a crisis
creates sufficient awareness and concern such that other countries become
more involved in the process; the environment becomes conducive to making some meaningful changes regarding supervision and more accountability
within the financial system. The assumption is that there will be gradual
relaxation on the urgency as the economy recovers and so accountability
reformers need to act quickly before reform losses support. To prevent the
conflict of interests/moral hazard problem within regulatory agencies, the
focus should include a greater social and intellectual heterogeneity, representing a broader range of constituents. (Baker, 2010)
Fig. 2 Plot of the correlation coefficients for
the 17 BHCs by size in 2006

This figure 2 shows the correlation coefficient (r) between the monthly
S&P 500 indices and the stock price of the top 17 BC for the year 2006.
The outlier in 2006 was Capital One Financial Corporation.
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Fig. 3 Plot of the correlation coefficients
for Capital One for 2001–2010

This figure 3 shows the correlation coefficient (r) between the monthly
S&P 500 indices and the stock price of Capital One Financial Corporation
for the period 2001 to 2010.

5. Conclusion
This paper reviewed the literature on factors that led to the Global Financial Crisis and finds that those factors had been known and identified for
several years prior to the crisis, yet that knowledge failed to assist in the
interception of the crisis, and those same factors continue to exist despite
regulatory efforts to the contrary. Also significant is the underrepresentation
of accountability and supervisory oversight, in proposed solutions, although
they are an integral part of the problem. Five fundamental weaknesses in
the banking system were identified, broadly, as suboptimal risk-taking incentives, pro-cyclicality, interconnectedness, unmanaged systematic risk, and
inadequate accountability and supervisory oversight.
The paper purports that: (1) focusing on the five fundamental factors
that attribute to the vulnerability of the banking system is a key component
to a model for interception of a financial crisis and; (2) the factors are interrelated; therefore, the model should be holistic in managing the systematic
risks that could lead to a crisis. Summarized, the model makes four recommendations. First, maintain the governmental safeguards despite the related
moral hazard problems, given the fragility of the banking system. Second,
identify a small list of key players to provide a more narrowly focused intervention/mitigation strategy. Third, utilize a financial distress prediction
23

model, such a discrete-time hazard model like the multi-period logit model,
to identify firm specific risks and systematic risks. Finally, maintain strong
regulatory rules that provide for oversight and accountability with causeeffect related enforced consequences.
A simple application of the blueprint was done to illustrate the importance
of closely monitoring those institutions that were flagged for intervention,
using stock price and S&P 500 index data provided by Capital IQ, a business owned by the Standard and Poor’s Company. Upon analyzing the data
for 2006, a year or two before the crisis became widespread knowledge, a
significant outlier was identified to be Capital One Financial Corporation
(COF), which received approximately $ 3.56 billion dollars in federal bailout, but was able to return the bailout funds, with interest, in 2009. The
application has been very instructive in validating the bailout strategy as
being feasible but it was also instructive in supporting the possibility of
“regulatory capture” in that the regulators should have known of the problem but had done nothing. If this is the case, and other research does
supports it, then regulatory supervision and accountability is the remaining
missing link to the mitigation of future financial crisis and must be a central
part of regulatory reform.
Evidence also substantiates the assumption that support for reform is
highest immediately after a crisis, but then starts to wane as the economy
recovers. Given the widespread and global impact of the recent financial
crises, the environment is very conducive for support and, therefore, for
change. This paper sets the scene for continuing research effort aimed at
integrating accountability and supervision into the reform process. Further
study and extensions of the findings of this paper could then provide for
specific strategic and tactical recommendations for that integration as well
as to present and test a quantitative, quantifiable model for crisis mitigation
that incorporates accountability and supervisory oversight, beyond the simple
application done here.
REFERENCES
Allen, L., and Saunders, A. (2004), “Incorporating Systemic Influences into Risk
Measurements: A Survey of the Literature,” Journal of Financial Services
Research 26(2): 161.
Baker, Andrew (2010), “Restraining Regulatory Capture? Anglo-America, Crisis
Politics and Trajectories of Change in Global Financial Governance,” International Affairs 86(3): 647.
Barrow, J. M., and Horvitz, P. M. (1993), “Response of Distressed Firms to Incentives: Thrift Institution Performance under the FSLIC Management Consignment Program,” Financial Management 22(3): 176–184.

24

Barth, J. R. et al. (2010), “Bank Regulation in the United States,” CESIFO Economic Studies 56(1): 112–131.
Berger, A. N., et al. (2008), “How Do Large Banking Organizations Manage their
Capital Ratios?” Journal of Financial Services Research 34(2/3): 123–140.
Berger, A. N., and Udell, G. F. (2004), “The Institutional Memory Hypothesis and
the Pro-cyclicality of Bank Lending,” Journal of Financial Intermediation 13(4):
458–495.
Boerner, H. (2010), “Where Do We Go from Here? As the Financial Crisis Appears
to Ebb, What Will Emerge?” Corporate Finance Review 14(4): 40–43.
Boyd, J. H. (1999), “Expansion of Commercial Banking Powers … or, Universal
Banking is the Cart, Not the Horse,” Journal of Banking and Finance 23(2/4):
655–662.
Chang, G., and Chang, F. (2013), “CEO Behavior and Subprime Mortgage Crisis,”
The International Journal of Business and Finance Research 7(3): 13–25.
Coffee Jr., J. C. (2011), “Systemic Risk after Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and
the Need for Regulatory Strategies beyond Oversight,” Columbia Law Review
(May) 111(4): 795.
Devereux, M. B., and Sutherland, A. (2011), “Evaluating International Financial
Integration under Leverage Constraints,” European Economic Review 55: 427–
442.
Dickson, J. (2010), “Too Focused on the Rules: The Importance of Supervisory
Oversight in Financial Regulation,” Cardozo Journal of International & Comparative Law 18(3): 623.
Drumond, I. (2009), “Bank Capital Requirements, Business Cycle Fluctuations and
the Basel Accords: A Synthesis,” Journal of Economic Surveys 23(5): 798–830.
Ennis, H. M., and Keister, T. (2010), “On the Fundamental Reasons for Bank Fragility,” Economic Quarterly – Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond 96(3): 33–69.
FASB (2013), “Financial Accounting Standards Board: Current Technical Plan and
Project Updates,” Retrieved March 15, 2013, from http://www.fasb.org/jsp/
FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1218220137074
Franz, L.W. (2010), “Consistency of the Stock Market in Anticipating Economic
Cycles,” Journal of Business & Economics Research 8(8): 53.
Haan, J. S., and Oosterloo, S. (2006), “Transparency and Accountability of Central
Banks in Their Role of Financial Stability Supervisor in OECD Countries,”
European Journal of Law and Economics 11: 255.
Holbrook, E. (2010), “Mending a Broken Banking System Risk Management,”
Emerald Management Reviews 5(3): 22–27.
Holowecky, E., et al. (2010), “Bank Regulatory Reform in the United States: The
Case of Goldman and the Volcker Rule,” Journal of Business Case Studies
6(6): 59–69.
IFRS (2013), “International Accounting Standards Board,” Work plan for IFRSs,
Work plan – as at 26 February. Retrieved March 15, 2013, from http://www.
ifrs.org/Current-Projects/IASB-Projects/Pages/IASB-Work-Plan.aspx
Kane, E. J. (2009), “Ethical Failures in Regulating and Supervising the Pursuit of
Safety-Net Subsidies,” European Business Organization Law Review 6: 185.
Klomp, J. (2010), “Causes of Banking Crises Revisited,” The North American
Journal of Economics and Finance 21(1): 72–87.
25

Lal, D. (2010), “The Great Crash of 2008: Causes and Consequences,” Cato Journal
30(2): 265–277.
Leondis, A. (2010), “The Global Financial Crisis: The G-20’s Most Recent Action
Plan,” Banking & Finance Law Review 25(2): 315–331.
McCormick, R. (2011), “Towards a More Sustainable Financial System: The Regulators, the Banks and Civil Society,” Law & Financial Markets Review 3: 129.
Mistrulli, P. E. (2011), “Assessing Financial Contagion in the Interbank Market:
Maximum Entropy versus Observed Interbank Lending Patterns,” Journal of
Banking & Finance 35(5): 1114–1127.
Murphy, D. D. (2010), “The Road to Financial Ruin: Warnings, Consequences,
Reforms,” The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies 35(2): 279.
Nier, E., and Baumann, U. (2006), “Market Discipline, Disclosure and Moral Hazard
in Banking,” Journal of Financial Intermediation 15(3): 332–361
Poole, W. (2010a), “Causes and Consequences of the Financial Crisis of 2007–
2009,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 33(2): 421–442.
Poole, W. (2010b), “Ending Moral Hazard,” Financial Analysts Journal 66(3): 17–
16.
ProPublica (2011), “Capital One Financial Corporation,” Retrieved July 12, 2011,
from http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/entities/66-capital-one-financial-corp
Raffer, K. (2004), “International Financial Institutions and Financial Accountability,”
Ethics & International Affairs 18(2): 61.
Ratnovski, L. (2009), “Bank Liquidity Regulation and the Lender of Last Resort,”
Journal of Financial Intermediation 18(4): 491–650.
Sanjeev, G. M. (2007), “Bankers’ Perceptions on Causes of Bad Loans in Banks,”
Journal of Management Research 4: 40.
Schwartz, R. (2008), “Regulatory Ethics in Theory and Practice,” Public Integrity
10(1): 37.
Scott, H. S. (2010), “The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the United States Financial
System,” Harvard Journal of Law and Policy 33(2): 671–735.
Shumway, T. (2001), “Forecasting Bankruptcy More Accurately: A Simple Hazard
Model,” Journal of Business 74(1): 101–124.
Singer, D. A. (2009), “The Subprime Accountability Deficit and the Obstacles to
International Standards Setting,” Global Governance 3: 23.
Teply, P. (2010), “Exit Strategies from the Global Crisis,” Proceedings of World
Academy of Science: Engineering & Technology 66: 1495.
Triana, P. (2010), “Basel III Can Still Hurt Banks (and Their Shareholders),”
Corporate Finance Review 15(3): 45–49.
Tsai, B., and C. Chang, C. (2010), “Predicting Financial Distress Based on the
Credit Cycle Index: A Two-Stage Empirical Analysis,” Emerging Markets,
Finance & Trade 46(3): 67.
Weber, A. (2010), “Banking Regulation,” CESifo Forum 11(3): 33–37.
© Janice M. Barrow, Steven W. Smalt

26

Copyright of Economics, Management & Financial Markets is the property of Addleton
Academic Publishers and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted
to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may
print, download, or email articles for individual use.

